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are not the constitutional "self-incrimination" and "illegal searches and
seizures" problems presented, in the case of the -peedmeter, which harry the
former line of cases. In Wyoming, moreover, large, legible signs along
the highway 49 warn the motorist that his speed may be checked by radar,
and the Wyoming Highway Patrol so far has confined its radar operations
to these posted areas. Thus the driver cannot be heard to yell, "Speedtrapl"
One court aptly stated that we live in a world where many wonderful
scientific devices are controlled by pushbutton, but that there is no reason
to have pushbutton justice. 50 How true this isl But neither should the
courts trip themselves up in the roots of antiquity. As a matter of public
policy the radar speedmeter can be of great value in law enforcement.
Something must be done about the senseless slaughter on the highways,
which is at least partly attributable to high speed.5 ' The speedmeter is
basically accurate, as has been concluded in the majority of decided cases
on the subject, and if this accuracy is proven in court, there seems to be no
good reason why evidence of speed based on use of the speedmeter should
not be admissible.
PAUL K. ADAMS

RIPARIAN RIGHTS IN APPROPRIATION STATES
Eight western states, Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah and Wyoming, professedly do not recognize the common
law doctrine of riparian rights. In this arid section of the country, a major
concern is the utilization of water for beneficial purposes such as irrigation,
mining and power. The fear has always been that what little water there
is will not be used to the fullest extent possible. As a result, the term
"water rights" has acquired a local technical definition such as the one set
out in a Wyoming statute:' "A water right is a right to use the water of
the state when such use has been acquired by the beneficial application of
water." It is not surprising, therefore, that in these states which follow
the doctrine of prior appropriation, the doctrine of riparian rights has been
thought of by the courts mainly in the terms of the right to the use of water.
However, many other rights of persons owning the banks of a stream have
been called riparian rights.
Black's Law Dictionary2 defines riparian rights as ,"The rights of the
owners of lands on the banks of water courses, relating to the water, its
49.
50.

Printed in black and white.
People v. Offermann, 204 Misc. 769, 125 N.Y.S.2d 179 ((1953).

51.

Col. William R. Bradley of the Wyoming Highway Patrol estimates that a goodsized, perhaps a majority, of accidents occurring on Wyoming highways are onecar, no collision accidents, and that speed is responsible for a large number of
these accidents.

1.
2.

Wyo. Comp. Stat. 1945, Sec. 71-312.
Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed. 1490 (1951).

NOTES

use, ownership of soil under the stream, accretions, etc."

Such rights of

riparian owners as to the right to fish, 3 the ownership of the bed of a
stream, 4 the ownership of accretions, 5 the right to unpolluted waters, 6 the
right to protect banks against erosion,7 the right not to have the current
of the stream diverted against a riparian's banks,8 not to have the stream
9
obstructed so that it will overflow riparian lands, and the right to access
10
have all been sustained on the basis of the common law
to the stream
doctrine of riparian rights. The purpose of this article is not to examine
the doctrine of prior appropriation nor to weigh its advantages or disadvantages, but to show that many incidents of riparian ownership which
have been called riparian rights in other jurisdictions do exist and are
recognized in these appropriation states.
In each of these states the courts have said that the doctrine of riparian
rights does not exist in the jurisdiction.1" The earliest decision which
repudiated any part of the doctrine was Coffin v. The Left Hand Ditch
Co., 1 2 a Colorado case decided in 1882.
All of the other appropriation
states leaned heavily on this decision for precedent in deciding the cases
in which they stated that the doctrine of riparian rights did not apply in
their jurisdictions. However, the conflict in the Coffin case was only between one type of riparian right and the doctrine of appropriation. The
right in conflict was the right of a riparian owner to the uninterrupted flow
of the stream, subject only to reasonable uses of the riparian owners above.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

12.

City of Birmingham v. Lake, 243 Ala. 367, 10 So.2d 24 (1942) ; Millsbaugh v. Northern Indian Public Service Co., 104 Ind. App. 540, 12 N.E.2d 396 (1938).
U. S. v. Elliott, 131 F.2d 720 (C.C.A. Okla. 1943); City of Birmingham v. Lake, 243
Ala. 367, 10 So.2d 24 (1942) ; Sutton v. Teret, 301 Ky. 506, 192 S.W.2d 382 (1946);
Mix V. Tice, 164 Misc. 261, 298 N.Y.S. 441 (1937).
Sutton v. Terret, 301 Ky. 506, 192 S.W.2d 382 (1946); Holmes v. Haines, 231 Iowa
634, 1 N.W.2d 746 (1942); Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 450 (1938);
Frank v. Smith, 138 Neb. 382, 293 N.W. 329, 134 A.L.R. 458 (1940).
Inland Steel Co. v. Isaacs, 283 Ky. 770, 143 S.W.2d 503 (1940); Jessup and Moore
Paper Co. v. Zeitler, 180 Md. 395, 24 A.2d 788 (1942) ; Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co. v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937).
Archer v. City of Los Angeles, 19 Cal.2d 19, 119 P.2d 1 (1941) ; Spencer v. O'Brien,
25 Tenn. App. 429, 158 S.W.2d 445 (1942).
Spencer v. O'Brien, 25 Tenn. App. 429, 158 S.W.2d 445 (1942) ; Bass et al. v. Taylor
et al., 126 Tex. 522, 90 S.W.2d 84 (1936).
Palmer v. Massengill, 177 Ala. 612, 58 So. 918 (1953); Flader v. Central Realty &
Investment Co., 114 Neb. 161, 206 N.W. 965 (1926).
Ferry Pass Inspectors' and Shippers' Association v. White's River Inspectors' and
Shippers' Association, 57 Fla. 399, 48 So. 643, 22 L.R.A. (N.S.) 345 (1909); Revell
v. People, 177 Ill. 468, 52 N.E. 1052 (1898).
Glough v. Wing 2 Ariz. 371, 17 Pac. 453 (188); Pima Farms Co. v. Proctor, 30 Ariz.
96, 245 Pac. 369 (1926); Maticopa County, etc. v. Southwest Cotton Co., 39 Ariz.
65. 4 P.2d 369 (1931); Coffin et al. v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882);
Pac. 168 (1909) ; Snyder v. Colorado Gold Dredging Co., 181 Fed. 62 (C.C.A. 8th,
1910); Montrose Canal Co. v. Loutsenhizer Ditch Co., 23 Colo. 233, 48 Pac. 532
(1896) ; Drake et al. v. Earhart, 2 Ida. 750, 23 Pac. 541 (1890) ; Reno Smelting, Milling, and Reduction Works v. Stevenson, 20 Nev. 269, 21 Pac. 317 (1889) ; In re Humboldt River, 49 Nev. 357, Pac. 692 (1926); Snow v. Abolos, 18 N.M. 681 140 Pac.
1044 (1914) ; Stowell et al. v. Johnson et al. 7 Utah 215, 26 Pac. 290 (1891) ; Whitmore v. Salt Lake City, 89 Utah 387, 57 P.2d 726 (1930) ; Spanish Fork v. Westfield
Irr. Co. v. District Ct., 99 Utah 527, 104 P.2d 353 (1940); Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo.
308, 44 Pac. 845 (1896); Farm Investment Co. v. Carpenter et al., 9 Wyo. 110, 61
Pac. 258 (1900).
6 Colo. 443 (1882).
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The Colorado court in deciding the case restricted its holding to the facts
when it stated,
"We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the
riparian owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel
upon and over his land, even though he makes no beneficial use
thereof, is inapplicable to Colorado."
Most courts cite the case for the proposition that no riparian rights existed
in Colorado. Even though none of the fact-situations which have confronted
these courts have called for much broader language than that used in the
Coffin case, they have made statements to the effect that the doctrine of
riparian rights did not apply in their jurisdictions, statements which go
beyond the facts of the cases in which they were made and are merely dicta.' 3
The basis of rationale generally used for the abrogation of the doctrine
of riparian rights in these states is that the common law has been adopted
only when and where it was suited to the conditions and topography and
was not in conflict with the state statutes or constitutions. It is said that the
doctrine of riparian rights is not suited to an arid clime and that it is inconsistent with statutory or constitutional provisions establishing the
doctrine of prior appropriation.
Admittedly one of the many rights which have been classified as
riparian is not suited to the climatic conditions of these states and is in
direct conflict with the doctrine of appropriation for beneficial use. This
was the right which Colorado repudiated in the Coffin case. However,
the right at common law of a riparian owner to have a stream flow in its
natural volume subject only to reasonable use by upper riparian owners
is the only phase of riparian rights which would lead to the wasting of
water or conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation. The other
riparian rights are subject to neither of these criticisms. They do not subject a stream to restrictions which would in any way prevent the fullest
utilization of its waters; neither do they come in conflict with the appropriation of the waters of the stream for beneficial use. There is no reason,
therefore, why the common law doctrine of riparian rights as it pertains
to these nonconflicting rights should not apply in appropriation jurisdictions.
The first group of rights to be considered is composed of those which
deal with riparian owners' title to land. Many title rights have been held
to be incidents of riparian ownership. One of the more important of such
rights granted under the common law is the ownership of the bed of a 1non4
navigable stream from the riparian's bank to the thread of the stream.
This right of the riparian owner has been recognized in many of the
appropriation jurisdictions. 15 Colorado, the jurisdiction in which the
13.
14.
15.

See note
See note
Hartman
Davis et

11, supra.
4, supra.
v. Tresise, 36 Colo. 146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 L.RA. (NS.) 872 (1905) ; Fischer v.
al., 19 Ida. 493, 116 Pac. 412 (1911); Heinbecker v. City and County of

NoTEs
Coffin case was decided, held in Hanlon v. Hobson'8 that the riparian
owner held to the thread of a non-navigable stream. This holding was
against the contention that since the doctrine of riparian rights did not exist
in Colorado the riparian owner could not have the title to the bed of the
stream. The court cited City of Denver v. Pearce17 in holding that the
original patent included title to the bed of a non-navigable stream and that
there was a presumption that subsequent conveyances included the bed
of the stream. Although many of the courts in these appropriation states
have never had to decide whether a riparian owner owns to the thread of
the stream, they have decided that riparian and littoral owners, when their
grant shows a meander line as a boundary, own to the actual water line of
a stream or a lake.18
Another title right which in riparian states is considered an incident
of riparian ownership is the right to accretions, which has been recognized
in several of these western states as a corollary to this rule of ownership to
the actual water line. In Poynter v. Chipman,19 a Utah case decided in
1893, the court said, "A littoral owner is entitled to the accretion lying
between the meander line and the edge of the waters." It can be seen that
the court has made the actual boundary the water line by using the common
law theory of accretions. In Smith v. Whitney, 20 decided in Montana in
1938, the court said, "Accreted lands . . . along the banks of navigable or
non-navigable streams belong to the riparian owner."
A second phase of riparian rights has to do with rights relating to the
flow of the stream. Excluding the right to an undiminished flow which
conflicts with the doctrine of prior appropriation, there are still many rights
of riparian owners relating to the flow of the stream, most of which have
been recognized in this region. In Hutchinson v. Watson Slough Ditch
Co.,21 a case decided in Idaho in 1909, the defendant, an appropriator, cut
off the flow of a natural stream. This action was independent of the
exercise of his right of appropriation. The defendant, a riparian owner,
brought the suit to enjoin the plaintiff's interference with the stream. The
court held for the plaintiff, saying, "The riparian owner's right to use the
water for domestic and culinary purposes and waternig his stock, and to
have the water flow by or through his premises is such a right as the law
recognizes as inferior to a right acquired by appropriation, but superior
to any right of a stranger, intermeddler, or interloper."

16.
17.
18.

19.
20.
21.

Denver, 90 Colo. 346, 9 P.2d 280 (1932) ; City of Denver v. Pearce, 13 Colo. 383, 22
Pac. 774, 6 L.R.A. 541 (1889) ; Halon et al. v. Hobson, 24 Colo. 284, 51 Pac. 443, 42
L.R.A. 502 (1897); A. B. Moss &cBros. v. Ramey, 25 Ida. 1, 136 Pac. 608 (1913),
aff'd, 36 S.Ct. 183, 239 U.S. 538, 60 L.Ed 425 (1916); Johnson v. Johnson, 14 Ida.
561, 95 Pac. 499, 24 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1240 (1908) .
24 Colo. 284, 51 Pac. 433, 42 L.R.A. 502 (1897).
13 Colo. 383, 22 Pac. 774, 6 L.R.A. 541 (1889).
Bode v. Rollwitz, 60 Mont. 491, 199 Pac. 688 (1921); Smith v. Whitney, 105 Mont.
523, 74 P.2d 450 (1938); Poynter v. Chipman, 8 Utah 442, 32 Pac. 690 (1893);
Hinkley v. Peay, 22 Utah 21, 60 Pac. 1012 (1900); Johnson Irr. Co. v. Ivory, 46 Wyo.
221, 24 P.2d 1053 (1933).
8 Utah 442, 32 Pac. 690 (1893).
105 Mont. 523, 74 P.2d 450 (1938).
16 Ida. 484, 101 Pac. 1059 (1909).
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The riparian owner has the right to protect his lands from erosion
restulting from the flow of the stream. Various means may be used to
accomplish this result, but there is also a corresponding riparian right that
water shall not be diverted so as to throw the current against banks with
greater force than is natural. Therefore, a party protecting his land must
be careful that he does not deflect the current against his neighbors' land.
Both of these rights have been recognized in this region when the problem
has arisen. 22 In deciding Fischer v. Davis, a 1913 Idaho case, the court put
the right to protect the banks of a stream on a common law basis of riparian
ownership. In a later case 23 between the same parties, the court in holding,
said, "A riparian owner has the right to maintain an action for an obstruction in such stream which diverts the stream against his banks causing him
damage."
A riparian owner also has the right that a stream shall not be so
obstructed as to cause it to back up and flood his lands. In Big Horn Power
Co. v. State,24 decided in Wyoming in 1915, the court ordered the removal
of a superstructure on a dam which caused water to flood riparian railroad
tracks. Although the court based its decision on the grounds of nuisance,
25
the same right has been upheld upon the grounds of riparian ownership,
not only in riparian states, but also in Arizona. In Kroeger v. Twin Buttes
Railroad Co. 2 6 the court of that state, after talking about climatic conditions
just as it did in refuting the doctrine of riparian rights to use water, said,
"... we think the rule of common law relative to the obstruction of running
streams to the injury of adjacent lands is applicable in this territory. .. and
it is a well settled rule of the common law that the waters of a natural
stream or water course may not be so obstructed by a lower proprietor as
to flow back to the detriment of those above him."
In addition to title rights and rights relating to flow, there are riparian
rights to purity of water, of fishery and of access to the stream. Both Idaho
and Montana have held that a riparian owner has a right of action against
one who pollutes a stream to the riparian's damage. 2T A recent Idaho
case 28 decided in 1953 was a suit by a grocery owner whose store was on the
bank of a stream which had been polluted with sugar beet pulp by the
defendant. The court allowed recovery on the theory that the pollution
constituted a nuisance. At common law the recovery would have been
based on the riparian right of purity. Regardless of the label imposed upon
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Fischer v. Davis, 24 Ida. 216, 133 Pac. 910 (1913);; Ladd v. Redle et al., 12 Wyo. 362,
75 Pac. 691 (1904).
See note 21, supra.
23 Wyo. 271, 148 Pac. 1110 (1915).
Palmer v. Massengill, 177 Ala. 612, 58 So. 918 (1953); Flader v. Central Realty&
Investment Co., 114 Neb. 161, 206 N.W. 965 (1926); Zalabach v. City of Kingfisher,
59 Okla. 222, 158 Pac. 926 (1916).
13 Ariz. 348, 114 Pac. 553, Ann. Cas. 1913 E 1229, 14 Ariz. 269, Ann. Cas. 1914 A 1289
(1911).
Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery, 20 Mont. 181, 50 Pac. 416, 23 Am.St.Rep. 622 (1897); Hill
v. Standard Mining Co., 12 Ida. 223, 85 Pac. 907 (1906); Conley v. Amalagamated
Sugar Co., 74 Ida. 416, 63 P.2d 705 (1953).
Conley v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., supra note 27.

NOTES

the recovery, the significant point is that a riparian owner, without an
appropriation right, recovered for the pollution of the stream by an upstream appropriator.
The exclusive right of fishery in non-navigable water bounded by
lands of the riparian owner was another common law riparian right which
has been recognized in some of these appropriation jurisdictions. 2", Even
Colorado, a state in which the tourist trade is a major industry and which
holds out fishing as one of its major tourist attractions, has held that the
riparian owner has a right to fish which is superior to that of the public.
In the case of Hartman v. Tresise,30 the Colorado court, in spite of heavy
opposition by sportsmen's groups, upheld a decision allowing a landowner
whose land bounded the stream in question, to recover in trespass against
a fisherman who was standing in the middle of the stream fishing. In
holding for the riparian landowner, the court not only said that the title
to the bed of the stream was in the riparian owner, but also stated that he
had a right to fish in the stream, where bounded by his lands, superior to
that of the public. Montana has also upheld the superiority of a riparian's
right to fish in non-navigable waters. 3 ' Although the New Mexico court, in
the case of State v. Red River Valley Co.,3 2 held that riparian owners do not
have the exclusive right of fishery, it was by a split decision of three to two.
The majojrity relied on the common law rule that there was no riparian
right of fishery in public waters, and held that this rule had been applied
to all New Mexico waters by a New Mexico constitutional declaration that
all waters in the state were public waters. The two dissenting judges differed with this construction of the word "public" and thought that the riparian
had the exclusive right to fish in waters that overlay his land.
As for access, in Shepherd v. Couer d'Alene Lumber Co., 33 the defend-

and had constructed a log boom which made a lake inaccessible from the
plaintiff's riparian lands. The court in holding for the plaintiff stated
that a riparian owner had the right of ingress and egress to and from the
water that was a property right which the court would protect.
Occasionally a court will reject the dictum that riparian rights are
abolished and point out that riparian owners have common law rights even
in appropriation jurisdictions. In the Hutchinson case 34 it was said, "This
court has on several occasions recognized some of the incidental common
law rights of riparian ownership in cases where those rights are not in conflict with the right of appropriation." In the Red River Valley case 35 both
the majority and minority opinions state that those phases of riparian rights
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925) ; Hartman v. Tresise, 36 Colo.
146, 84 Pac. 685, 4 L.R.A. (N.S.) 872 (1905).
See note 29, supra.
Herrin v. Sutherland, 74 Mont. 587, 241 Pac. 328 (1925).
State v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
16 Ida. 293, 101 Pac. 591 (1909).
See note 21, supra.
See note 32, supra.
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that do not conflict with the doctrine of prior appropriation are in full
force as a part of the common law as adopted in New Mexico.
Even though the courts in the other appropriation jurisdictions have
not been so thorough as the New Mexico and Idaho courts in their analysis
of the problem and have been content to echo the dicta of early cases, it
can be seen that a large number of riparian rights have been recognized.
In each of these states the courts have upheld one or more of these rights
and together they have given effect to almost every riparian right that
existed at common law. Although these states pride themselves on their
appropriation doctrine, there is no reason why the mere mention of the
word "riparian" should immediately give rise to hostility and suspicion in
their courts. Those riparian rights which do not in reality conflict with
the doctrine of prior appropriation should be recognized in these states
even if put squarely on a common law riparian basis.
WILLIAM

E. FOSTER

